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Due to its borderless nature, COVID-19 is a matter of common European interest
since its first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been
handled as an essentially national matter. Each country adopted its own different
health response, according to its own risk analysis framework, with little regard for
the scientific and management risk advice provided by the EU, notably the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
After some initial country-by-country variation, member states have progressively
converged on ‘social distancing’ as the preferred non-pharmaceutical approach
(NPA) to counter the disease. Virtually, all countries – with the notable exception of
Sweden – required social distancing of the entire population, through the prohibition
of public gatherings, schools closures (total or partial), and introduced border/travel
restrictions, both for intra-state and intra-EU mobility. More than half of the Member
States had proclaimed the state of emergency as examined in the Verfassungsblog’s
Fighting COVID 19 debate.
Due to their inherent cross-border spillovers, many of these national responses to
COVID-19 raise major concerns under EU law. Yet only a few of them have been
timidly denounced by the EU Commission as the Guardian of the Treaty. How long
will this last?
Such a decentralized and uncoordinated COVID-19 crisis management has been
and remains not only a source of confusion for citizens in a highly interdependent
Union, but also a cause of constitutional concern for the Union’s own integrity. To
justify such an outcome as the inevitable consequence of EU’s limited competence
in public health is a well-rehearsed yet largely inaccurate argument.
True, while the Treaty mandates that a high level of human health protection be
guaranteed in all Union policies, it explicitly excludes (Article 168.5 TFEU) the
possibility for the EU to adopt public health harmonizing measures or to organise
and deliver of health services and medical care on its basis. However, the very
same provision entrusts the EU to play inter alia a complementing, supporting role
by coordinating Member States – which maintain the main responsibility for public
health – in the “fight against […] serious cross-border threats to health” and “also
adopt incentive measures designed to […] combat the major cross-border health
scourges”.
Believe it or not, protecting citizens from such threats – notably “to improve
surveillance and preparedness for epidemics”– is one of the three strategic
objectives of the current EU health policy and can (and must) be read in conjunction
with other health-related legal basis, such as disaster protection (Article 196 TFEU).
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Since the early 1990s, the EU set up a network to ensure the epidemiological
surveillance of communicable diseases, and an Early Warning Response System
for the prevention and control of these diseases. Following the SARS and H1N1
outbreaks, this network was upgraded into a fully-fledged legal framework for
European Union action on health emergencies – the Cross-border Health Threats
Decision. This is coordinated by the Health Security Committee (HSC), which is in
existence since 2001, and builds upon the scientific input of the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control. In the case of COVID-19, an ad hoc advisory expert
panel – composed of epidemiologists and virologists from different Member States
and chaired by the EU Commission President – has been set up to formulate ‘EU
guidelines on science-based and coordinated risk management measures’.
The Cross-border Health Threats Decision expressly requires Member States and
the Commission to consult each other in the Health Security Committee (HSC) –
which is made up of representatives from the ministries of health – with a view to
coordinate Member States' public health responses and crisis communication.
It is manifest that neither occurred until approximately mid-March 2020, after the
Italian government activated the EU civil protection mechanism established under
the “solidarity clause” (Article 222 TFEU).
Yet, on 25 January 2020, the ECDC alerted all Member States that:
“In light of the currently available information […] the potential impact of
2019-nCoV outbreaks is high and further global spread is likely”.
Member States failed to come together and react jointly by enacting instead national
responses. While several factors explain the ineffectiveness of the EU Cross-
border Health Threats mechanism as currently designed and operationalized, they
essentially all point to a major, structural cause. Health care being in Member States’
hand, the pre-conditions to make a sustained EU-wide public health coordination
happen are far from being met. Those range from the existence of common methods
for data collection on the spread of the virus, the characteristics of infected and
recovered persons and their potential direct contacts, a EU-wide common testing
strategy to cross-border cooperation in healthcare emergency assistance; all areas
clearly falling under the healthcare exclusive competence of each member state.
Not only the EU does not have any of these frameworks in place, but also lacks a
mapping of its member states emergency preparedness plans as of today.
As Member states are moving to phase 2 of the COVID-19 crisis by relaxing some
of their restrictions, the EU is expected to play a greater role than the one exercised
in the first stage of the outbreak. This is not only required to eventually discharge
its Treaty mandate, but also to ultimately saving lives. This new role for the EU in
responding to the next phase of the pandemic management consists of the design
and enforcement of a EU-wide coordinated approach to the lifting of restrictive
measures (and potentially their reintroduction) in the coming weeks and months.
That’s what the EU Commission proposed, together with European Council, by
taking into account how the specific epidemiological situation, territorial organisation,
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healthcare service arrangements, population distribution or economic dynamics
might affect Member States’ decisions on where, when and how measures are lifted.
The Joint European Roadmap towards Lifting COVID-19 Containment Measures (EU
Exit Roadmap) offers three main criteria to assess whether time has come to begin
to relax the confinement for each and every member state:
• An epidemiological criterion showing that the spread of the disease has
significantly decreased for a sustained period of time;
• Sufficient health system capacity, i.e. the extent to which the different health
care systems can cope with future increase in infection rates after lifting of the
measures;
• Appropriate monitoring capacity,including large-scale testing capacity to
detect and monitor the spread of the virus combined with contact tracing and
quarantine capacity in case of reappearance and further spread of infections.
This rather unusual guidance document strikes a fine balance between the need
for EU-wide coordination and Member States’ different country-specific needs and
cost-benefit calculus. It essentially introduces a set of meta-criteria or benchmarks
framing the exercise of member states’ health prerogatives. In so doing, it also
leaves each member state the choice, depending on their size and organization, “at
what level compliance with the criteria above should be assessed” (e.g. regional or
macro-regional level rather than at national level).
This roadmap, together with a flurry of new documents freshly produced under
time pressure by the EU Commission through its above-described public health
emergencies bodies, call for a close legal analysis. These guidance documents
include the ‘COVID-19 Guidelines for Border Management Measures to Protect
Health and Ensure the Availability of Goods and Essential Services’, the ‘Guidelines
on EU Emergency Assistance inCross–Border Cooperation in Healthcare related
to the COVID-19 crisis’, the ‘App Toolbox on the use of digital means to empower
citizens to take effective and targeted social distancing measures’, and the proposed
‘Guidance for common testing strategies’. While adopted in a situation of emergency,
these guidance documents show a timid yet auspicious attempt by the Union to
operationalize untested competences contained in the Treaties and to do so in a
situation of emergency.
The question is then if and to what extent the Commission will be enforcing those
guidelines, notably the EU Exit Roadmap, while called upon to discharge its duty to
balance public health benefits against other social and economic impacts.
What if a given Member State lifts its COVID-19 restrictions too early, i.e. in the
absence of a “significantly decreased of the spread of the disease for a sustained
period of time”? What if it does so despite not having ‘sufficient health capacity’ in
case of reappearance? Or what if a country fails to reintroduce a restrictive when the
spread of the virus has significantly increased?
Far from constituting EU legal acts, and produce legally effects invocable by third
parties, these guidelines are set to raise legitimate expectations vis-à-vis EU
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citizens, companies and also member states. While they may certainly be used to
contextualize the examination of the legality of these national measures under EU
law, in particular their proportionality, it remains unclear what their most immediate
and long-term legal implications may be. Theoretically, should they go through the
legislative process and be transformed into legislative acts, the EU COVID-19-
related guidelines could qualify as “incentive measures” under the new and untested
Article 168(5). Incentives measures would emerge as a novel tertium genus falling in
between existing coordination public health measures and prohibited harmonization
public health measures.
Be as it may, by testing the outer limits of the EU public health competence,
COVID-19 is set to go down in history as a major catalyst in the advancement of EU
health emergency action. Never before, legally defining – or re-defining – who does
what, how and when under EU law meant saving lives or causing deaths.
On this note, you may wonder how possible it is that EU leaders could miss a one-in-
a-generation opportunity to translate into action the “A-Europe-that-protects” mantra
that was so well-rehearsed ahead of the latest EU parliament elections. French
President Emmanuel Macron  famously crafted this strategic narrative to address the
EU’s failure “to respond to its peoples' need for protection from the major shocks of
the modern world” (sic).
As suggested in this brief legal account of the EU response to COVID-19, it would
have been and remains possible for the EU to make a difference in the sanitary (not
only financial) crisis induced by this pandemic.  While this won’t make it up for the
lives lost, its symbolic value shouldn’t be underestimated.
To learn more about the world’s and European’s regulatory response to COVID-19,
you can read the Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation: Taming
COVID-19 by Regulation.
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